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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 




NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
KENNEDY, SCHWARTZ & CURE (STUART LICHTEN of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, VICE-PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL 
(ROBERT K. DRINAN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York City Transit Authority 
(Authority) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on an improper practice 
charge filed by the Transport Workers Union of America, Local 100 (TWU) alleging that 
the Authority violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c)1 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) when it denied an employee's request for union representation while he was 
required to write a statement in the presence of his supervisors responding to 
allegations of workplace misconduct. The ALJ found that the Authority had violated 
§209-a.1(a) of the Act, reiying on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
1Because of her findings, the ALJ did not reach the §209-a.1 (c) allegation. No 
exceptions have been taken to that aspect of the ALJ's decision and we, therefore, do 
not reach it. 
CASE NO. U-22551 
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National Labor Relations Board v. Weingarten2 (hereafter, Weingarten). In that case, 
the Supreme Court found that an employee has a statutory right to refuse to submit 
without union representation, once requested, to an interview which he reasonably 
fears may result in his discipline.3 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Authority argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred by relying on 
Weingarten. It argues that the holding in Weingarten may not be applied to employees 
covered by the Act because of the differences in the language of §202 of the Act and 
§7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) upon which the Court based its decision 
in Weingarten. The Authority further argues that there exists no statutory right under 
§202 of the Act to union representation during an investigatory interview, that Civil 
Service Law (CSL) §75 provides such Weingarten rights as the Legislature has deemed 
may be applicable to public employees in New York, that legislation proposed in the 
2001 legislative session illustrates that the Legislature interprets §202 of the Act as not 
providing for Weingarten rights and that the facts of the case fail to support the finding 
of a violation. The TWU supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are not in dispute, the parties having submitted the case for decision 
on a stipulated record. 
2420US251 (1975). 
3ld. at 256. 
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In April 2001, the Authority directed an employee, Igor Komarnitskiy, to respond 
in writing on a "G-2" form to an allegation that he had made a racial remark to a fellow 
employee. Komarnitskiy asked for, and was given, the opportunity to meet with a TWU 
representative, Michael Russell, while he completed the form. The Authority, concerned 
thatRussell either-wrote-or-influenced-Komarnitskiyls-reply on theJorm,-directed 
Komarnitskiy to complete another G-2 form, without union representation. Komarnitskiy 
prepared another G-2 form in the presence of his supervisor while in a locked office. 
TWU representatives attempted to enter the office but were denied access by the 
Authority. 
DISCUSSION 
While the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
and the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director),4 and the ALJs5 have issued several decisions in which the 
applicability of the Supreme Court's holding in Weingarten has been discussed, the 
Board has not had the opportunity to directly reach the issue. 
4
 See City of Watervliet, 32 PERB 1(4595 (1999); New York City Transit Auth., 28 
PERB 1(4597 (1995); Depew Union Free Sch. Dist, 21 PERB 1(4558, aff'd on other 
grounds, 21 PERB K3043 (1988); New York City Transit Auth., 19 PERB 1(4618 (1986). 
5
 See New York City Transit Auth. (Lykes), 30 PERB 1f4655 (1997), rev'd on 
other grounds, 31 PERB 1(3024 (1998); City Sch. Dist. of the City of Buffalo, 28 PERB 
K4582 (1995); Gates-Chiii Cent. Sch. Dist, 25 PERB K4683 (1992); City of New York-
Dep't of Investigation, 9 PERB K4509 (1976), aff'd on other grounds, 9 PERB 1(3047 
(1976), confirmed sub nom. Sperling v. Helsby, 60 AD2d 559, 10 PERB K7021 (1st 
Dep't1977). 
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In Weingarten, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision of the NLRB in which it 
held that there is, under §7 of the NLRA, a statutory right of an employee to refuse to 
submit without union representation, when union representation has been requested, to 
an investigatory interview which he or she reasonably fears may result in discipline. 
-Sectio-n-Z-otthe NLRAprovides, in-relevant part,Jhat: 
Employees shall have the right to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection....6 
The Court in Weingarten reasoned that: 
...it is a serious violation of the employee's individual right to 
engage in concerted activity by seeking the assistance of his 
statutory representative if the employer denies the 
employee's request and compels the employee to appear 
unassisted at an interview that may put his job security in 
jeopardy. Such a dilution of the employee's right to act 
collectively to protect his job interests is, in our view, 
unwarranted interference with his right to insist on concerted 
protection, rather than individual self-protection, against 
possible adverse employer action.7 
The Court's emphasis is on the concerted nature of the request for union 
assistance. No greater emphasis is placed on the words "mutual aid or protection" than 
on the words "concerted activity". We do not find that the absence of identical language 
in §202 of the Act compels a conclusion that Weingarten is inapplicable to employees 
covered by the Act.8We find that there is no clearer expression of participation in an 
6Section7, 29USC§157. 
7Supra, note 2 at 257. 
8Section 202 of the Act provides that "Public employees shall have the right to 
form, join or participate in...any employee organization of their own choosing." 
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employee organization than the request for union representation at an investigatory 
interview which may result in discipline, such as an employee's suspension, loss of pay 
or termination. In City of Buffalo,9 we stated that: 
Employees have the protected statutory right to have union 
representation with respect to any issue affecting their 
employment relationship,-whether-or-notthatissue 
embraces a mandatory subject of negotiation. That request 
for and receipt of union representation constitutes 
participation in a union, a right specifically protected by §202 
of the Act. 
The Authority's reliance on Dutchess Community College™ is misplaced. 
While our decision in that case compares and contrasts the language of §202 of the Act 
and §7 of the NLRA, it was in the context of activity that was concerted but not 
protected. There, the employees joined together to discuss working conditions with their 
employer, but their discussions were not related to union activity as they neither 
belonged to nor sought to form or join an employee organization. As §202 of the Act 
does not protect concerted activity that is for "mutual aid or protection", we found that 
the employees' activities were not protected by the Act. Here, the employee's request 
for assistance was individual but was done as the exercise of his right, protected by 
§202 of the Act, to "participate" in an employee organization. 
930 PERB H3021, at 3048 (1997). 
1017 PERB H3093 (1984), rev'd, 18 PERB 1J7010 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County), 
rev'dsub nom. Rosen v. PERB, 125 AD2d 657, 20 PERB 1J7006 (2d Dep't 1986), affd, 
72 NY2d 42, 21 PERB fl7014 (1988). 
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The Authority argues that the Legislature recognized that a Weingarten right does not 
exist under §202 of the Act by the introduction of legislation in the 2001 legislative 
session which would have provided a right to representation upon request during an 
investigatory interview in which it reasonably appears to the employee that he or she 
may-be-thesubject-of potentiaLdisciplinary-actionJrhe_sponsorIs-memoranda_forJhat 
legislation11 and identical legislation introduced in 2002,12 reveals that the intent of the 
legislation was to "eliminate any uncertainty and disagreement over the question" of 
whether Weingarten rights were encompassed by the Act, given the fact that the Board 
has not yet decided the issue and the decisions of the Director, Assistant Director and 
the ALJs were not consistent. The introduction of the legislation for that purpose does 
not compel a determination that §202 does not grant public employees covered by the 
Act the same rights articulated in Weingarten. 
Finally, that a right to representation at investigatory interviews which may 
reasonably be believed to lead to disciplinary action is accorded to some public 
employees under CSL §75 does not compel a finding that such a right may not also be 
encompassed by the language of §202 of the Act. The rights and duties accorded by 
§75 are independent from the rights and obligations set forth in the Act.13 
The Authority's argument that its action was a measured response to Russell's 
involvement in the completion of the first G-2 form and the subsequent efforts of the 
11
 A. 8741-A 
12A.10288-A. 
13See County of Ulster, 26 PERB P008 (1993). 
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TWU representatives to assist Komarnitskiy in completing the second form is without 
merit. Whether the employer acts in an overtly hostile, threatening manner or merely 
denies an employee's request for representation and requires the employee to 
participate in an investigatory interview, the Act has been violated. Indeed, it is also in 
-the-employer'sJnterest4o-have4he-employee-represented_by_his-union.~"A-single 
employee confronted by an employer investigating whether certain conduct deserves 
discipline may be too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being 
investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors. A knowledgeable union 
representative could assist the employer by eliciting favorable facts...."14 
We here find that an employee has the right to union representation during an 
investigatory interview which may reasonably lead to discipline. The Authority's actions 
clearly illustrate why there is such a right under the Act - to take an employee behind 
closed doors, without representation, and direct him to write a response to allegations 
of workplace misconduct in the presence of his supervisor is precisely the situation in 
which an employee is most in need of his or her union representative. The Supreme 
Court recognized the inequities to be addressed in such a situation in its Weingarten 
decision: 
Requiring a lone employee to attend an investigatory 
interview which he reasonably believes may result in the 
imposition of discipline perpetuates the inequality the Act 
was designed to eliminate and bars recourse to the 
safeguards the Act provided "to redress the perceived 
i m K g l o n r > o r\f 'c*r*r\r\r\imir* r\r\\hrc±r Ka f \A fQQn loKr^r mnrl 
I I I I k / C I I C I I I W U W I U L f U I I V J I l l i U kyvyVVVsl L / W L V V ^ ^ I I I U M V I U I 1 U 
Supra, note 2, at 262-3. 
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management." (Citing to American Ship Building v. NLRB, 
380 US 300 at 316 (1965)).15 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the Authority's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ finding that the Authority violated §209-a.1(a) of the Act when it 
denied a unit employee's request for union representation at an investigatory interview 
that the employee reasonably believed might result in discipline. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the New York City Transit Authority will: 
1. Forthwith cease and desist from requiring employees in the unit 
represented by the Transport Workers Union of America, Local 100, to 
participate in an investigatory interview when the employee has requested 
TWU representation and the employee reasonably believes that the 
interview may result in discipline. 
2. Forthwith remove the second G-2 form completed by Igor Komamitskiy 
from his personnel file and not consider it for any purpose. 
3. Forthwith reconsider any discipline that was imposed upon Igor 
Komamitskiy based on the second G-2 form without reference to that 
form. 
15/d. 
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4. Sign and post the attached notice in all locations normally used to 
communicate with employees in the unit represented by TWU. 
DATED: October 2, 2002 ^ ^ 
Albany, New York —"7. * j (/L/( J 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
vM /A 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES1 FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
We hereby notify the employees of the New York City Transit Authority (Authority) in the bargaining 
unit represented by Transport Workers Union of America, Local 100 (TWU) that the Authority shall: 
1. Forthwith not require employees to participate in an investigatory interview 
when the employee has requested TWU representation and the employee 
reasonably believes that the interview may result in discipline. 
) 2. Forthwith remove the second G=2 form completed by Igor Komarnitskiy from his 
personnel file and not consider it for any purpose. 
3. Forthwith reconsider any discipline that was imposed upon Igor Komarnitskiy 
based on the second G-2 form without reference to that form. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
MElAf V Q D I f <~ITV T D A M S I T Al I T H O P I T V 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LYRIC P. SMITH, 
Charging Party, 
and CASE~NQTU-23181 
ORGANIZATION OF STAFF ANALYSTS, 
Respondent. 
LYRIC P. SMITH, pro se 
JOAN STERN KIOK, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by Lyric P. Smith to an 
Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision dismissing his improper practice charge 
alleging, as amended, that the Organization of Staff Analysts (OSA) violated §209-
a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by failing to respond to 
Smith's letter of January 14, 2002. OSA filed an answer that denied the material 
allegations of the charge and alleged, as an affirmative defense, that the charge failed 
to state facts establishing OSA's conduct was either arbitrary, discriminatory or done in 
bad faith. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Smith excepted to the dismissal of his charge on the grounds that the ALJ's 
determination was not supported by the facts. 
Board - U-23181 -2 
FACTS 
The ALJ's determination was based upon stipulated facts contained in the 
conferencing ALJ's letter dated May 5, 2002, confirming the parties' agreement at the 
pre-hearing conference as to the relevant facts. 
Smith wrote a letter to Michael Collins, an OSA representative, on January 14. 
2002 (annexed to the charge) referring to an incident in which Ruth Pasquale, a 
New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) Assistant Vice President, took away Smith's 
metro pass; complaining of his employment and pay status; and seeking OSA's 
assistance in several areas. It is undisputed that on the day Pasquale took away 
Smith's pass, he went to OSA's office and spoke with Collins. Collins told him that he 
would attempt to assist him with the matter of the pass. 
Collins made several telephone calls to Smith and left messages on his home 
voice mail regarding the pass issue. Collins stated that he had called the NYCTA Labor 
Relations office and Pasquale regarding the matter. Smith received a copy of Collins' 
January 16, 2002 letter addressed to Ralph Agritelley, NYCTA Vice President of Labor 
Relations, which letter pertains to the OSA's handling, of Smith's Office of Administrative 
Trials and Hearings (OATH) case. On January 23, 2002, Smith went to the OSA's 
office and spoke with Collins and Collins asked him to sign and have notarized a 
medical release form. It is further undisputed that Collins requested the medical 
release form in order to obtain medical documents on behalf of Smith for the purpose of 
Smith's OATH case. 
OSA agreed to pay the attorney fees of Louis Stober, Esq., for representation of 
Smith in the OATH hearing, up to a stipulated monetary limit. The OSA agreed to this 
about February, 2002. A conference was held in Smith's OATH case on 
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April 4, 2002, a hearing was commenced on April 12, 2002, Stober represented Smith 
on those days, and Collins was present during the conference and hearing and assisted 
in his representation. 
The conferencing ALJ gave the parties until May 22, 2002 to submit 
argumentsJn_s_upport^ 
OSA moved to dismiss the charge because it failed to state facts sufficient to find 
a violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Act. By letter dated May 21, 2002, Smith 
responded, arguing that OSA, generally, and Collins, specifically, had not 
responded to his January 14, 2002 letter. 
DISCUSSSION 
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the ALJ "must assume the truth of all the 
charging party's evidence and give the charging party the benefit of all 
reasonable inferences that could be drawn from those assumed facts."1 Here 
the parties stipulated to the facts. As stipulated, the ALJ found that the charge 
failed to state a violation of the Act. We agree. 
Smith alleged that OSA breached its duty of fair representation by failing to 
respond to his January 14, 2002 letter. Upon our review of the record, we find that 
Smith failed to make a prima facie showing of arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith 
conduct on the part of OSA.2 The record is replete with telephone calls and 
\suurny ui /vassal/ (rouce uep tj, i / rc t^o ]jou IO, ai ouou (laa^). 
2See United Fed'n of Teachers (Ayazi), 32 PERB 1J3069 (1999); CSEA, Local 1000, 
AFSCME (Heffelfinger); 32 PERB 1J3044 (1999); Public Employees Fed'n, AFL-CIO and 
State of New York (Dep't of Health), 29 PERB 1J3027 (1996); CSEA v. PERB and Diaz, 
132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1)7024 (3d Dep't 1987), affirmed on other grounds, 73 NY2d 
796,21 PERB ^7017(1988). 
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correspondence from the OSA to Smith evidencing their communications with him. 
Furthermore, since OSA decided that it could npt represent Smith at his §72 hearing, 
OSA agreed to pay Smith's private counsel for legal services in connection with the 
hearing. 
The duty to respond is analyzed in light of the reasonableness of the employee's 
request,3 and the manner in which the union has responded.4 Here, the evidence 
demonstrates that OSA responded to Smith on numerous occasions and in a variety of 
ways. It is not entirely clear from his exceptions the type of response Smith asserts 
was warranted in this case, but we do not find, on this record, that OSA's actions were 
arbitrary, discriminatory or taken in bad faith. 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny Smith's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: October 2, 2002 
Albany, New York 
V 
l^ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
3
 Westchester County Dep't of Correction Superior Officers Ass'n, Inc., 26 PERB fl3077 
(1993). 
4United Fed'n of Teachers (McLaughlin), 24 PERB 1J3002 (1991). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE TROOPERS, INC., 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22830 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF STATE POLICE), 
Respondent. 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (MARK T. WALSH of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION 
This case comes to us on an interlocutory appeal from an interim ruling of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) declining to defer the instant improper practice charge 
to arbitration pursuant to the standards articulated in Herkimer County Board of 
Cooperative Educational Services.^ The charge, filed by the Police Benevolent 
Association of the New York State Troopers, Inc. (PBA), alleges that the State of 
New York (Division of State Police) (State) violated §§209-a.1(a), (c) and (d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it denied the PBA access to an 
employee during an investigatory interview concerning a "critical incident" in which the 
employee had been involved. 
120PERB |f3050(1987). 
Board - U-22830 -2 
The State sought deferral of the charge to the parties' contractual grievance 
procedure, alleging that the contract covered the charge and that no rights of unit 
employees protected by the Act had been affected by its actions. The conference ALJ 
determined that if the alleged violation of §209-a.1(a) of the Act was purely derivative of 
the_allegedJ209-aJ_(d)jvJo^ 
parties' contractual grievance procedure. If, however, the §209-a.1(a) allegation set 
forth an independent violation, deferral would not be appropriate. To that end, the ALJ 
directed the parties to file briefs on the applicability of the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in National Labor Relations Board v. Weingarten2 to employees 
covered by the Act. That decision provides, inter alia, that an employee has the 
statutory right under §7 of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to refuse to 
participate in an investigatory interview without union representation, once union 
representation has been requested, if he or she reasonably believes that the interview 
may result in discipline. 
We do not usually review rulings of the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director), Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director) or an ALJ until such time as all proceedings have 
been concluded.3 This policy is designed to prevent the delay inherent in piecemeal 
review and the potential prejudice resulting to the parties therefrom. An interlocutory 
2420US251 (1975V 
3See Council 82, AFSCME and State of New York, 32 PERB 1J3040 (1999); 
Watertown City Sch. Dist, 32 PERB fl3022 (1997); United Transp. Union, Local 1440, 
31 PERB U3027 (1998); State of New York (Div. of Parole) and Council 82, AFSCME, 
25 PERB P007 (1992). 
Board - U-22830 -3 
appeal from a ruling made in conjunction with the processing of a case is by our 
permission only pursuant to Rules §212.3(h). We have granted permission for an 
interlocutory appeal only in a few cases presenting extraordinary circumstances.4 
We find that the instant appeal presents just suchan extraordinary circumstance 
because it raises new issues with regard to our deferral policy.5 We have long held that 
we will not defer an alleged violation of §209-a.1(a) of the Act to arbitration,6 unless the 
alleged (a) violation is purely derivative of an alleged §209-a.1(d) violation.7 Such is the 
case, for example, when no independent facts, such as improper motivation, in support 
of the alleged (a) violation, are pled.8 
Given our oft-articulated standard for deferral of an improper practice charge 
which alleges independent violations of §§209-a.1 (a) and (d) of the Act, it was not 
necessary for the ALJ to analyze the merits of the alleged §209-a.1 (a) violation in order 
to decide whether the matter could properly be deferred to the parties' contractual 
grievance procedure. As we noted in Schuyler-Chemung-Tioga BOCES,9 "we will not 
defer an alleged violation of §209-a.1 (a) of the Act simply because there is a provision 
4See New York State Housing Finance Agency, 30 PERB1J3022 (1997); 
Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free Sch. Dist, 28 PERB 1J3034 (1995); Mt. Morris Cent. 
Sch. Dist, 26 PERB 1J3085 (1993); County of Nassau, 22 PERB fl3027 (1989). 
5Town of New Windsor, 32 PERB 1J3049 (1999). 
6See Addison Cent. Sch. Dist, 17 PERB 1J3076, at 3116 (1984). "Deferral is 
discretionary and is not usually applied when a violation of §209-a.1 (a) is alleged...." 
7
 See County of Westchester, 30 PERB 1J3059 (1997). 
8Jasper-Troupsburg Cent. Sch. Dist, 27 PERB 1J3005 (1994). 
934 PERB 1J3019, at 3044 (2001). 
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in the parties' collective bargaining agreement that restates or reiterates the language 
of §209-a.1(a) or provides rights similar to those found by PERB to flow from 
§209-a.1(a)oftheAct." 
Here, the State argues that the parties' collective bargaining agreement contains 
language that^etsJbrth^allJbe^ 
representation. That the contract may contain language that mirrors or is substantially 
similar to rights arguably guaranteed by the Act is not sufficient to warrant deferral of an 
independently alleged §209-a.1(a) violation.10 All the ALJ needed to do was determine 
whether the alleged §209-a.1(a) violation was purely derivative of the alleged §209-
a.1 (d) violation. Consequently, a determination on the applicability of Weingarten was 
not necessary as this is not an issue of first impression. That the Board had not yet 
decided whether the rights set forth in Weingarten are applicable to public employees 
under the Act was not dispositive of the deferral decision.11 There are a number of ALJ 
decisions that have held that Weingarten rights are guaranteed by §202 of the Act. 
10/d. 
11We have today decided that public employees have the right under §202 of the 
Act to union representation, upon request, during an investigatory interview when the 
employee reasonably believes that the interview may result in disciplinary action. See 
New York City Transit Auth., 35 PERB 1J3029 (October 2, 2002). 
Board - U-22830 -5 
Therefore, the improper practice charge set forth a cognizable violation of §209-a.1(a) 
of the Act. The ALJ's inquiry should have ended there. 
We, therefore, reverse the ALJ's decision insofar as he found it necessary to 
analyze the applicability of Weingarten. We affirm his decision not to defer the improper 
practice charge to the parties' contractual grievance procedure. The matter is, 
therefore, remanded to the hearing ALJ for further processing consistent with our 
holding herein. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: October 2, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Mjehael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
1 
lohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE SUPREME COURT 
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, ILA, LOCAL 2013, 
AFL-CIO, 
Gharging-Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-23131 




NEW YORK STATE COURT OFFICERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
PAT BONANNO, ESQ, for Charging Party 
LAUREN P. DE SOLE, ESQ. (RICHARD MC DOWELL of counsel), for 
Respondent 
WHITEMAN OSTERMAN & HANNA (NORMA MEACHAM of counsel), for 
Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York State Supreme 
Court Officers Association, ILA, Local 2013, AFL-CIO (SCOA) to an Administrative Law 
Judge's (ALJ) decision to grant intervenor status to the New York State Court Officers 
Association (COA) and to the ALJ's decision denying SCOA's motion to recuse. 
Board - U-23131 -2 
EXCEPTIONS 
SCOA's exceptions are an interlocutory appeal on legal grounds to the ALJ's 
decision to grant intervenor status. Also, SCOA excepts to the ALJ's denial of its 
motion to recuse. 
CQA-respondedJoLthe_exceptionsgenerally_denyJngJhe_allegations_set_forthJn 
the exceptions and pointing out that "...the improper practice charge filed by SCOA 
claims the bargaining unit work currently performed by the COA, properly belongs to 
SCOA. This statement alone provides a basis for COA intervention, confirmed by the 
Regional Director's July 24, 2002 grant of COA's motion." 
The State of New York, Unified Court System (UCS) supported intervention in its 
response to the exceptions. 
DISCUSSION 
This interlocutory appeal is a continuation of the pre-hearing dispute that 
resulted in this Board's decision of June 12, 20021 in which we granted SCOA's 
exceptions to the ALJ determination granting COA's oral motion to intervene. We there 
held that COA's motion to intervene must be in writing. 
In our prior decision, we noted for the parties that: 
As a general rule, this Board will not review the interlocutory 
determinations of the Director or an Administrative Law Judge until 
such time as all proceedings below have been concluded, and 
review may be had of the entire matter. It is only when extraordinary 
circumstances are present and/or in which severe prejudice would 
otherwise result if interlocutory review were denied that we will 
entertain a request for such review. 
1
 35 PERB 1J3021 (2002). 
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The papers before us do not present any extraordinary circumstances or severe 
prejudice sufficient to invoke our jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings. The basis 
for intervention, a transfer of bargaining unit work to COA, was set forth in the innproper 
practice charge. Consequently, since COA is presently engaged in work which SCOA 
-alleges-belongsioJt,_any_remed^^^ 
The grant of the motion to intervene can be sufficiently reviewed and, if necessary, ' 
remedied on appeal of the hearing ALJ's final decision. 
The remaining exception concerning the ALJ's failure to recuse himself is also 
denied. SCOA has not demonstrated any prejudice in the ALJ's denial of SCOA's 
motion.2 Pursuant to §212.4(a) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules), the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) shall designate the ALJ to 
conduct the hearing. It has been the policy and practice of this agency to assign an 
ALJ to the conference phase of an improper practice charge and usually to assign a 
different ALJ to the hearing. Indeed, this matter has been assigned to a different ALJ 
for hearing. Any purported prejudice on the part of the conference ALJ is cured by the 
assignment, as a matter of office practice, to a hearing ALJ. Any concern that the 
conference ALJ's handling of the improper practice charge through the conference 
stage of these proceedings may also be raised, to the extent permitted by our Rules 
and decisions, in the appeal, if any, of the ALJ's final decision. 
2
 State of New York (Bruns), 25 PERB 1J3007 (1992). We there held specifically that an 
) interlocutory appeal from an ALJ's declination to recuse would be permitted only if the 
allegations would require the disqualification of the ALJ. 
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Further, it has been noted that: 
[0]ne of the primary functions at the conference is to assist the 
parties in reaching a resolution of the charge . . . . To facilitate such 
resolutions, the board views most statements made at a prehearing 
conference to be settlement discussions, which are not admissible at 
a hearing. That policy precludes the admissibility of statements 
made by the ALJ at the conference, whether or not that ALJ 
-SubsequentLy^presides^overihe^hearing.3 
There being no grounds presented which meet our standards for an 
extraordinary interlocutory review, we will not consider SCOA's appeal of the 
conference ALJ's rulings at this stage of the proceeding.4 Our decision herein is 
without prejudice to SCOA's right to file such exceptions to the final decision in this 
matter as it considers to be warranted pursuant to §213.2 of the Rules. 
For the reasons set forth above, SCOA's motion is denied. SO ORDERED. 
Dated: October 2, 2002 
Albany, New York 
(7 
Miphf el R. Cuevas, Chairman 
bbott, Member 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
3
 Jerome Lefkowitz, et a!., Public Sector Labor and Employment Law, 681 (2d ed. 
1998). 
4
 SCOA's interests in this matter would, perhaps, be better served by prosecuting the 
instant charge, rather than interlocutory appeals which do not even approach the 
standard we have set for such a review of the interim rulings of an ALJ. 
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PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS 
AND POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22223 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES - GROVELAND 
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY), 
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HINMAN STRAUB P.C. (NANCY L. BURRITT of counsel), for Charging Party 
^ WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHAEL N. VOLFORTE of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) finding a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) on an improper practice charge filed by the New York State 
Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association, Inc., (NYSCOPBA) alleging 
that on or about October 31, 2000, the State of New York (Department of Correctional 
Services - Groveland Correctional Facility) (DOCS) unilaterally terminated a past 
practice of allowing unit employees to convert accrued sick leave absences to accrued 
vacation leave without prior approval. 
DOCS submitted an answer that denied the allegations and affirmatively set forth 
J six defenses. DOCS primarily argued that there has been no change because the use 
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of leave accruals is covered by the parties' collective bargaining agreement, as well as 
the Civil Service Attendance and Leave Rules. Thus, DOCS argues, it has satisfied its 
duty to negotiate regarding the subject of leave accruals. 
EXCEPTIONS 
DQCSls_exceptions_relate_generallyLtoJhe_ALJlsjdecision_onJ:he_law_andJhe 
facts and, more specifically, address the ALJ's finding that DOCS (Groveland) 
unilaterally changed the practice by which unit employees could convert their sick leave 
to vacation leave without prior authorization. 
NYSCOPBA argued in its response that the ALJ was correct in his findings and 
conclusions of law. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
A full exposition of the facts is found in the ALJ's decision.1 We, therefore, 
confine our inquiry to facts relevant to the exceptions raised by DOCS. 
On December 15, 2000, NYSCOPBA filed an improper practice charge alleging, 
inter alia, that DOCS had 
a long-standing policy and practice of allowing employees who have 
utilized sick leave to, within one year of the date of the sick leave 
absence, have that absence charged against their vacation accruals 
rather than their accrued sick (eave. On or about October 31, 2000, 
NYSCOPBA local leadership at Groveland was advised, by memo 
from the Denutv Sunerintendent for Administrative Services, that this 
practice would no longer be permitted. 
135 PERB 1f4541 (2002). 
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The memo annexed to the charge was dated October 31, 2000 and sent to 
NYSCOPBA Chief Steward, P. Gallagher, from Steven Kruppner, Superintendent for 
Administrative Services. Kruppner wrote: 
[T]his is in response to your 10/25/00 memo regarding allowing staff 
to convert previously utilized sick leave to vacation. I did advise both 
Timekeeping and the Planning Office that I disapprove of this 
practice. I also have discussed the issue with the Superintendent 
and the Executive Team who concur with me . . . . 
NYSCOPBA called three officers in its direct case who testified that sometime in 
early 1998, they became aware that, upon their written request to the timekeeper, their 
use of sick leave could be changed to a vacation accrual. Each testified that they, on 
occasion, had utilized the practice and had their accruals changed, and that the 
practice continued until Kruppner issued his memorandum. 
At the close of NYSCOPBA's direct case, DOCS, through its counsel, moved to 
dismiss on the ground that NYSCOPBA had failed to prove a prima facie case. The 
ALJ denied the motion and DOCS presented its case. 
DISCUSSION 
Initially, we must address the ALJ's denial of DOCS's motion to dismiss the 
charge for failure to prove a prima facie case. We disagree. 
We have previously established a standard of proof within which to 
judge the merits of a motion to dismiss. We have held that with 
respect to "a motion made to [an ALJ] to dismiss a charge after the 
presentation of charging party's evidence . . . [w]e would reverse [an 
ALJ's] decision to grant such a motion unless we could conclude that 
the evidence produced by the charging party, including all 
reasonable inferences therefrom, is plainly insufficient even in the 
absence of any rebuttal.2 
'State of New York (PEF), 33 PERB 1J3024, at 3065 (2000). 
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It is axiomatic that the charging party in an improper practice charge alleging a 
unilateral change in a past practice has the burden of proof to establish by a 
preponderance of the reliable evidence that the past practice is unequivocal and has 
been in existence for a significant period of time such that the employees in the unit 
could reasonably expect the practice to continue without change.3 This must be 
established on the charging party's direct case because we have held that the charging 
party cannot rely upon cross-examination of the respondent's witnesses to establish a 
prima facie case.4 If such a practice is found to exist, the employer is not privileged to 
change such practice without first negotiating with the union.5 
DOCS argued in its motion to dismiss that NYSCOPBA failed to prove a prima 
facie case. We agree. In Bellmore, supra, we held that a "past practice will generally be 
viewed as a practice that affects the unit as a whole."6 Here, the unit represented by 
NYSCOPBA is the Security Services Unit of New York State employees. Groveland is 
but one facility among many where employees within NYSCOPBA's bargaining unit are 
employed. We have held previously that employees of DOCS are within units defined 
on a State-wide, rather than a facility-by-facility, basis.7 
3
 Bellmore Union Free Sch. Dist, 34 PERB 1f3009 (2001). 
*State oJNew York (PEF), supra, note 2, at 3065. 
"County of Westchester, 35 PERB 1J3025 (2000). 
6Bellmore, supra, at 3018. See also County of Nassau, 24 PERB fl3029 (1991). See 
also City of Rochester, 21 PERB ^3040 (1988), confirmed, 155 AD2d 1003, 22 PERB 
1J7035 (4th Dep't 1989). 
7State of New York (Dep't ofCorr. Serv. - Butler Corr. Fac), 34 PERB 1J3014 (2001). 
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The evidence produced by NYSCOPBA in its direct case establishes, at best, 
that certain employees at Groveland, all of whom worked on the same shift, for a period 
of approximately two years, were allowed to change use of sick leave accruals to 
vacation accruals. We find that NYSCOPBA has, thus, failed to establish an 
unequivocal unit-wide practice that all unit employees could reasonably expect to 
continue. Having failed to establish all the elements of a prima facie case, 
NYSCOPBA's charge should have been dismissed pursuant to DOCS's motion. 
Based upon the foregoing, we grant DOCS's motion to dismiss and reverse the 
decision of the ALJ. We, therefore, need not reach DOCS's other exceptions. 
The charge must be, and hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: October 2, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
i/iL k «•<> n /l/f/f/W 
" J Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
LOCAL 808, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5218 
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding1 having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Local 808, has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
1
 A certification/decertification petition is appropriately used where, as here, the number of positions 
sought to be added to a unit is large enough to put the incumbent union's majority status in question. 
Ogdensburg City Sch. Dist, 31 PERB1J3060 (1998). 
Certification - C-5218 
the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All employees of the employer in the job titles of telephone 
operator/receptionist, communications operator, clerk-typist, clerk 
messenger, file clerk, accounting clerk (all grades), senior 
accounting clerk, accounting clerk-budget, payroll accounting clerk, 
chief mail clerk, messenger, executive secretary, secretary, 
secretarial assistant, tape librarian, accounting clerk assistant, I/O 
control clerk, senior I/O control clerk, senior I/O control-data 
management, computer operator, lead computer operator, word 
processing operator and bursting decollating clerk. 
Excluded: All other employees, including the shift supervisor (Data Center), 
operations supervisor (Data Center) and confidential personnel of 
the employer. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 808. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: October 2, 2002 
Albany, New York 
lyijcb^ef R. Cuevas^/Chairj^an/ sjf_ 
^ivferc"AYA^ti!HVlember lkm 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5220 
VILLAGE OF TANNERSVILLE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 294, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: Laborers and working foreman. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
-negotiate_coJlective]yjyvithJheJ^ 
Teamsters, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation 
to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession1. 
DATED: October 2, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chair 
/ / M a r c A. Abbott, Member 
1
 Member Mitchell recused himself from consideration of this case. 
